This has been adapted from an assignment for an English graduate seminar in Spring 2025: “Writing Centre and Writing Program Administration for Social Justice”.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) presents a foundational vision of “freedom, justice, and peace” built upon the equality and inalienable rights of all people. Adopted as a “common standard of achievement,” it aims to guide the actions of nations in promoting universal respect for human rights. However, a critical examination reveals that the document is not a neutral, universal standard but rather a product of its time, deeply rooted in a Western, individualistic paradigm. This ideological framework is also evident in related theories of justice, raising significant questions about their universality and practical application.
The UDHR, for instance, employs relatively broad and undefined terms. Concepts such as “dignity” and “inalienable rights” lack explicit definitions, leaving their interpretation open to different cultural and political contexts. While this may have been done for brevity and to facilitate wide distribution, the ambiguity can lead to significant contradictions in practice. For example, the principle of universal rights often conflicts with national security policies. The case of Shamima Begum, who had her British citizenship revoked, and the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act of 2000, which contravenes Article 12 of the UDHR, both demonstrate how nation-states can subordinate international human rights to their own interests in the name of security.
These practical challenges are a symptom of deeper philosophical issues. The liberal tradition, which informs both the UDHR and major theories of justice, centers on the individual rational agent. John Rawls’s theory of “Justice as Fairness” is a prime example. The concepts of the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance” are intended to reconcile social differences by having individuals exclude knowledge of their own circumstances to arrive at an impartial view of justice. However, this highly abstract approach is idealistic and fails to adequately address how real-world inequalities can be resolved. While Rawls’s idea of injustice as any inequality that is not to the benefit of all is an interesting one, it opens up a complex line of inquiry: what would a “beneficially unequal” society look like, and could it ever function without undermining the very principles of equality?
The inherent individualism of this liberal paradigm is a major point of contention. As Makau Mutua argues, this “unrelenting focus on individualism” often clashes with the communal values prevalent in many non-Western cultures, thereby challenging the premise of human rights’ universality. Mutua contends that while “social truths are initially local,” they can, and must, become universal through dialogue that acknowledges different cultural contexts. He critiques the human rights discourse for its silence on crucial terms of modernity such as “capital,” “colonize,” and “imperial.” This strategic obfuscation creates a fundamental flaw in the practical application of universal theories of rights and justice, particularly in a post-colonial world.
While Mutua’s critique is compelling, his own work is not without its own generalizations. His repeated use of the term “the African (postcolonial) state” perpetuates a Eurocentric perspective that views Africa as a monolith. Grouping all of Africa’s 54 distinct nations—each with unique histories and challenges—under a single umbrella term obscures crucial nuances. For instance, the multi-ethnic, highly factional Nigerian state cannot be analyzed in the same breath as Uganda. A more precise approach would be to focus on specific post-colonial conditions rather than a continent-wide generalization, much in the same way one would not group all of Europe or Asia under a single term.
In conclusion, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and liberal theories of justice, such as that proposed by Rawls, reflect an individualism that limits their practical application and claim to universality. While they provide a vital framework for discussion, they must be critically interrogated and adapted to account for the diverse philosophical and cultural foundations of a global society.
References
Morsink, J. (2009). Chapter 1 of Inherent Human Rights.
Mutua, M. (2008). “Human Rights in Africa: The Limited Promise of Liberalism.”
Phillips, A. (2024, August 7). Shamima Begum loses final UK court bid over citizenship. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2n8xv61x3o
Rawls, J. (1974). Excerpts from A Theory of Justice.
UN General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Adekunmi Olatunji 